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DURING the past few days the cables from London have given evidence of a somewhat different attitude on the part of the British government towards the diplomatic problem of the war. The decision to allow the British socialists to attend the Stockholm conference is only one indication of an apparently increasing disposition to carry on the fighting with less exclusively military weapons. Another is the declared intention of the Prime Minister to define the war aims of his country. Exchanges of views are taking place among the several Allied governments with the object of obtaining a statement of joint purposes which will prevent Russian secession and do away with some of the discrepancies between the declared American policies and those of France, Great Britain and Italy. The resolutions just passed by the French Chamber are informed by a manifest wish to meet the requirements of the Russian provisional government. Particularly serviceable was their emphatic assertion of an intimate relationship between a league of nations and the future independence of all peoples, great and small. Thus a diplomacy based on ideas is being added to diplomacy based on force; and in a competition of this kind the Allied governments will possess a superiority over the Central Powers so decisive that the chances of victory will be proportionately improved.

NOW that the delegates to the socialist peace conference are actually assembling at Stockholm much of the misunderstanding which greeted the preparations for its assemblage is being dissipated. It should be interpreted fundamentally not as an intrigue engineered either by the friends of Germany or by her enemies, but as an attempt made by the socialists throughout the world to repair the dissensions created by the war in their ranks and to recover some basis of intercourse and mutual understanding. Socialism as an international force crumpled up in August, 1914. In all the belligerent countries except the United States the socialist majority has loyally supported its own government in the prosecution of the war. But the socialists have always been uneasy about intellectual confinement to an exclusively national allegiance, and they are taking the first opportunity to escape from it. The attitude of the Russian socialist party, its exceptional power and its frank desire for a settlement of the war which would not do violence to the principles underlying socialist internationalism, has provided the opportunity. It remains to be seen whether it will be able to make the conference useful as a means of resurrecting the international socialist movement or as an agency for formulating a better agreement on common principles among liberals in all the nations.

THE fact, now generally accepted abroad, that the Stockholm Conference is being conducted in good faith makes the refusal of the American State Department to consent to the presence of American delegates look particularly benighted. The English socialists are being permitted and even encouraged to attend a gathering which Americans are forbidden to attend. Participation in a conference which is considered to be serviceable to the English cause is stigmatized in this country as an

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enemy conspiracy. There is, it is true, a difference between the two cases. The English conferees will presumably be socialists who supported English participation in the war, just as the Russian and German conferees have given a conditional support to their own governments. The proposed American delegates, on the other hand, were all men who have subscribed to the declaration that the war which America is now waging is the least justified in modern history. The State Department might conceivably have insisted upon the dispatch to the conference of American socialist delegates whose allegiance to the cause of their own country was undisputed and who would not represent the American socialist faction which believes in conniving at German aggression rather than resisting it; but it should have encouraged rather than discouraged some kind of American representation. These unofficial and informal conferences on the comparative political objects of the several fighting nations are useful not because they can or should bring immediate peace, but because they may clear away some of the preliminary obstacles to the ultimate success of an official peace conference. A nation like the United States which is fighting for essentially international objects has nothing to fear and much to gain from such conferences. They tend to create an international atmosphere favorable to the vitality of the program contained in the President's Senate address of last January. A war that is being fought for ideas must also be fought with ideas.

THE Liberty Loan need not be subscribed several times over in order to offer irrefutable evidence of the financial power of the United States. In no other country, even at the beginning of the war, could a two billion dollar loan, bearing so low an interest rate, have been floated at par. And the United States has been accustomed to higher rates on investments than European countries. Besides, we are making practically a cash transaction out of this flotation, whereas other countries, notably Germany, have availed themselves freely of governmental credit control in supporting their loans. Any German firm engaged in supplying the government has found it imperative to aid in making a market for government bonds. Munition makers, suppliers of clothing and food for the army, as well as a wide range of producers indirectly deriving employment from the government have perforce subscribed freely. In effect they have taken bonds in part payment for their products. Such bonds, accepted by the banks as collateral for loans, have served practically all the purposes of cash. In the circumstances, what wonder is it that German loans have been oversubscribed? Without any similar devices for forcing a market, we shall still make a success of our loan.

IF the war continues through another two years the increase in our national debt will be colossal. We may find ourselves at the end of the war paying interest on twenty billions, or even forty billions. This everyone knows. But there are certain timid patriots who reproach us for saying it. They fear that if the possibilities of increasing debt are candidly set forth the success of the Liberty Loan may be endangered. This fear seems groundless. It must be generally understood that if any later loan bearing a higher rate is issued, the holders of Liberty Loan bonds have the privilege of refunding. The government, it goes without saying, will make such conditions as may be necessary to float at par any bonds it may issue; accordingly there is no prospect at all of Liberty Loan bonds falling to a discount while the war lasts. The issue of government bonds to the extent of twenty or forty billion would lead to a depreciation, not in government bonds, but in all other capital values. The more serious the prospect of a gigantic public debt, the greater is the relative advantage of an investment like the Liberty Loan which can not depreciate.

THE excess profits tax is gradually improving its character under the hands of the Senate. It now seems probable that the tax will be based upon the excess above the average profits of three or five years of peace. The Senate still clings to a flat rate, and this is unfortunate. A progressive rate is applied in England without apparent administrative difficulty. Such a rate should be drastic enough to take the major part of profits greatly exceeding the normal, without being so heavy as to remove the incentives to maximum production. Without effective excess profits taxation, it is clear that we shall be driven to price regulation in many fields where the difficulty of fixing prices is serious. With such taxation, we can leave the question of prices to take care of itself, except in the case of a few of the prime necessities.

THERE seems to be another revolution in China. Peking, Tokyo and Shanghai cables are confusing in the extreme, but one deduction seems to be inevitable. The President, Li Yuan Hung, will probably retire. His choice is limited to the manner thereof. President Li has not been much more than a figurehead since he first came into prominence as the nominal leader of the revolt at Wuchang in October, 1911. Hsu Shih Chang is another amiable gentleman, now put forward as Dictator by those who pull the strings.

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President Li did not want to break with Germany, and he refused, as did the Chinese Parliament, to declare war. The President is reported to be an honest man. Parliament was blatantly corrupt. German money was spent freely and resulted in an outburst of rhetoric on the blessings of peace and the folly of war. The military party demanded drastic action. Its head, Tuan Chih Jui, the Premier, having failed for the moment to dictate the government's policy, retired. The Genarals in several provinces have declared their independence of Peking. Peking will shortly, and probably without bloodshed, confess that it has been in error and submit to the mandate of the Generals.

A SUGGESTION from Tokyo that China may shortly be in a state of anarchy is ominous, for if this should be the case, Japan might feel obliged to assume the task of maintaining order. In the meantime, however, business in China will continue as usual. Trade will probably in this, as in recent revolutions, be but little disturbed. Customs revenues and the salt gabelle, which are administered by foreigners, will be collected, and the people as a whole will mind their own affairs and let the politicians play their own game. It is a coup d'état rather than a revolution. The army is a political organization in which many thousands find a livelihood, rather than a military machine. The army has dismissed a President who was not "regular," and will substitute another figurehead who will do its bidding. In the meantime this political skyrocketing will not tend to improve China's international status.

SINCE the departure of Marshal Joffre, Mr. Balfour and M. Viviani, of Senator Root and Mr. John F. Stevens, we have heard little of the various High Commissions which were to visit London and Paris, and probably Rome. Special representatives are here from Italy, and others are coming from Russia and Japan. A Cuban Mission has come and gone. But for American Ambassadors Extraordinary there seems no urgent call. Europe doubtless can do well enough without them. The destroyers with the Allied fleets and the promised troops for France; the Red Cross units that have already gone, will be for the moment our most fitting plenipotentiaries on the other side of the Atlantic. In the bustle, however, of receiving distinguished foreign visitors, and in the pressure of administrative reorganization in Washington, one matter of vital importance seems to have been overlooked. What is becoming of Pan-Americanism? In Central America several states have followed our lead and that of Cuba in breaking with Germany. Brazil may declare war at any moment. Bolivia, too, has severed relations with the Kaiser's government. Is it not time that we set upon this demonstration of the reality of what we have preached so long? Would it not be well to vitalize Pan-Americanism by sending to Brazil and to Cuba and Central America missions competent to lay before the nations that have broken with Germany, and possibly others that may do so, the aims of the United States, our plans of coöperation with the Allies, and the significance of the whole enterprise for the future of the American republics?

ONE of the absurdities that will doubtless become part of the permanent stock of Teutonic and Teutonized socialistic dogma is that the United States entered the war for the sake of protecting sums of money loaned to England and France. It has never been the custom of the Socialists to charge the capitalistic class with lack of insight into its material interests. Indeed, capitalism has been credited with a quite superhuman intelligence, unclouded by sentiment or morality. Now, what evidence of intelligence is there in the act of throwing good money, and a lot of it, after bad money representing very little in the aggregate? What our capitalists stood a chance of losing, if the Allies had gone down in overwhelming defeat, was less than two billions of dollars. What they are certain to lose, if the war continues through two years more, is just as large a proportion of a twenty or forty billion dollar war bill as drastic income and profit taxes can collect. They are also certain to lose heavily in their capital values when the influence of war borrowings upon the interest rate makes itself felt. If an unscrupulously intelligent capitalism had been in control of our government, we should have remained out of the war, busily occupied with building up trade with neutral territories and preparing ourselves for new financial conquests in the period of rehabilitation.

THE mine workers are quite justified in their demand for representation on the Committee on Coal Production of the Council of National Defense. A committee consisting exclusively of operators, or of operators and outsiders, is doubtless capable of effective service to the nation in eliminating various sources of inefficiency inherent in unregulated production. Such a committee should be able to cope with the problems of transportation and storage, make adequate arrangements for the supply of credit to the weaker mines, and effect a more rational distribution of labor. Important additions to output can thus be secured. But as everyone knows, the most serious

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problems in the coal industry arise out of the relations of employers and employees. At this time a general strike or lockout would be a national calamity, and even such sporadic local disputes as have occurred with increasing frequency in late years are intolerable. We can not have harmony in the industry unless we enlist the patriotism of the workers as well as that of the employers. We need representatives of labor on the Committee, to advise the government as to the demands of the men and, if these cannot be granted, to make clear to the men why this must be so. Irreconcilable anti-unionists may raise the objection that this would mean official recognition of the labor organization. True: but the admission of the employers to the Committee implies the recognition of an employers' organization.

BY all means let us all celebrate the removal of the censorship provisions from the espionage bill. Let us call their disappearance a straight victory for liberty. Let us congratulate Congress upon its zeal for free speech. But after we have had our optimistic fling, and have grown sober enough to use our eyes, why not admit what is perfectly obvious, namely, that a passion for free speech counted for much less in the result than the desire of the legislative branch of the government to take a crack at the executive? Just now the desire is even stronger than usual, and in the censorship provisions of the bill Congress saw and seized a chance to gratify this desire with impunity. The net result is good. The President does not now need the censoring power he asked for. His failure to get it is not likely to cause any leak of news valuable to Germany, and in a country that is being organized more and more autocratically every day it has positive value. But is there anything to be gained by permitting our liking for the result to blind us to its causes?

STRICTLY speaking, the President did not ask to have the power of the censor in the United States increased. He asked to have it transferred, and the refusal of Congress leaves this power where it was and as strong as ever. From the beginning of newspapers, news and opinion have been censored by owners, editors, managing editors, night editors and city editors. In this quarrel, whatever they may severally think about freedom of speech in the abstract, the freedom they have fought for is mostly freedom for themselves. Their power as censors, which is often unfelt because it is diffused among hundreds of men who open and shut different doors, is seen in its real dimensions when somebody asks to have it gathered together and handed over to a few government officials.

MR. WALTER LIPPMANN has temporarily severed his connection with the editorial board of The New Republic to enter the service of the War Department.

What Democracy Demands of the Allies

THE Russian democracy doubts. It has been assured again and again that the war, undertaken at the outset in defense of the rights of small nations, a vital democratic interest, is divesting itself of incidental objects and establishing even more firmly its character as a war of democracy against military absolutism. Russia has been promised, as the fruit of the effort she is expected to put forth, an organized peace that will insure every democratic nation against the benumbing influence of intrigue and menace from beyond the national boundaries. But suspicion of abstract formulas, of well sounding words, is characteristic of Russian democracy as indeed of self-conscious democracy everywhere. Where are the deeds that prove the democratic tendency of a war that has already cost millions of lives and demands more millions of lives before it can be brought to an end? The mere fact of active military operations on the part of the more democratic Allies against the less democratic Central Powers is not enough. Germany may be defeated, but whether democracy will thereby be rendered secure must depend upon the use the Allies make of their victory.

Can there be any question as to what the Allies will do when they have defeated Germany, or that their final dispositions will make for democracy and peace? Avowed Allied intentions involve changes in the boundaries of nations within the European continent, changes in the relations of European states to backward regions in Africa and Asia, changes in commercial relations, and some sort of international organization for the defense of peace. These intentions have received a minimum of official discussion in recent months. Allied statesmen have been preoccupied with the more pressing problem of conducting the war. Let Germany first be defeated: we can then attack the problems of reorganization. But this is to reckon without democracy and its insistence upon sufficient reason to justify the sacrifices involved in defeating Germany. If the Russian democracy in particular is to be won back to energetic performance, there is need of a clearer outline of the Allied objectives than has been officially given.

What do we know about the Allied objects for reconstituting the map of Europe? We know that the return of Alsace-Lorraine is demanded by

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France, and that the demand is supported by the Allies. There are Russian democrats who are revolted by the thought of continuing the agony of war in order to satisfy this demand. They do not wish to die for the sake of "righting historic wrongs." And indeed if there were no better ground for restoring Alsace-Lorraine to France than those founded on history, democracy would have little to gain from the restoration. The crucial question, from a democratic point of view, is whether the people of Alsace-Lorraine wish to live under France or to remain under Germany. If, as there seems to be good reasons for believing, the sentiment of the people is in favor of returning to France, a democratic settlement should afford them a chance to do so.

A complete victory for the Allies would create a wholly independent state of Poland, adding to Russian Poland the Polish territories of Prussia and Galicia. Such a disposal of the Polish question would command the unqualified approval of every democrat. As we pass southward and eastward, however, the redistribution of territory that would be effected by the Allies becomes less and less nationalistic and in so far less and less democratic. Grant the Trentino to Italy and parts of Istria, as essentially Italian territory. Would a plebiscite give Trieste and Dalmatia to Italy? Would a plebiscite transfer Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, Bukowina to Rumania and wrest from Bulgaria the territories she is now occupying in Macedonia and the Dobrudja? These are all doubtful cases. The Allies might have excellent reasons, political and military, for disposing of such territories without too close regard to nationality. But they are not on their face democratic reasons.

So far as concerns territorial rearrangements in the colonial domain, very little indication of democratic purpose is at hand. Kiao-Chao has been transferred from German hands to Japanese —not the slightest gain from a democratic point of view. Southwest Africa has been conquered by the Commonwealth of South Africa and is expected to become an integral part of that commonwealth. This may be set down as a democratic gain, since the grazing and mineral resources of the territory form a continuity with those of the British colony and sooner or later would be occupied by Dutch and British from the Cape. German East Africa, Kamerun and Togo will simply be transferred to the British or French. There is here no democratic gain.

The defeat of the Central Powers will doubtless involve the complete dismemberment of Turkey. Armenia and Syria may be set up as autonomous states. Arabia may be similarly disposed of. In so far Allied success would comport with the democratic principle. As for Mesopotamia and the Anatolian peninsula, it is improbable that any principle of nationality or of democracy will enter into their final disposition. Imperialism will govern as it has governed in the solution of the problem of the conquered German colonies.

In the matter of trading relations, it is clear that the victorious Allies will not permit an early recovery of German trade of a nationalistic character involving the absorption of backward territories through "peaceful penetration." Exploitative and political German trade is gradually being extinguished. The trade of Germany will have to return to an individualistic basis. But in the meantime nothing has been done to protect backward regions from exploitation on the part of traders owing allegiance to the Allies. The mere supplanting of German trade by that of her enemies is a neutral fact, from the point of view of democracy. Doubtless at the close of the war we shall find the Allies have made commercial arrangements that encourage the economic development of each member of the group and that make provision for the supplying of its pressing needs. But there have been no published indications of developments in this direction since the more or less abortive Paris Conference.

If peace could be assured by Allied victory, if not in perpetuity, at least for generations, democracy could afford to waive all other considerations of policy. Time would obliterate any mistakes made in territorial readjustments. Time would also bring about the abrogation of commercial arrangements inspired by national egoism rather than by consideration of the common welfare of nations. What assurance of peace is offered by Allied policy in its present state of development? The recipe of defeating and weakening Germany is not adequate. However complete the Allied victory may be, there will remain some seventy million Germans in Central Europe to reckon with. Conceivably they might be split into several countries, forced to repudiate their dynasties, loaded down with indemnities, hampered in their attempts to recover their economic position. Peace could not thus be assured. The military alliance against them would have to be made perpetual to hold them to such conditions.

How can peace be assured through a return to the old system of particularistic nations loosely attached to one another by treaties? The war will leave ranklings that can only with great difficulty be kept from developing into new causes of war. Some kind of permanent international organization is clearly necessary if the world is to be made safe for democracy. Now, what are the Allied statesmen doing in the way of blocking out the plans for

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such an organization? Eight months ago the idea of a league of peace appeared to be making rapid progress. Other affairs have monopolized the attention of the men who lead and rule. To one who does not know what may be happening under the surface—and all democrats are in this case—the prospects of an effective international organization seem less bright than they seemed last autumn.

The cause of the Allies is no doubt the cause of democracy. But it is not enough that the recondite policies of the Allies should ultimately make for democracy. The masses of the population can judge only from announced policies, from acts and from omissions. On the basis of these, what certain judgment can be arrived at in support of the contention that Allied success will insure the ultimate triumph of democracy? The Russian democrat at any rate is left in doubt. And the consequences to the Allies are evil.

It will be said that for military reasons it is impossible for the Allied statesmen to set forth their intentions so explicitly as to clear away democratic doubts. This may be true so far as concerns territorial arrangements on the continent of Europe. It is not true of questions pertaining to the colonial domain and to trade. It is still less true of questions pertaining to international organization. The formation of a permanent league, with a constitution broad enough to admit at the close of the war neutrals, and, on conditions, even Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, could not in any way weaken the Allies or give encouragement to their enemies.

Moreover, such a league could provide the machinery for stripping Allied policy of its imperialistic appearances. If the Allies have the power, they must put Germany out of Africa and place a final quietus upon the iniquities of Turkish rule. They need not divide the spoils. They can vest the government of such territories in the league, which would naturally give all its members equal trading and development rights in its dominions. It would be better still if the whole of Africa from the Sahara to the Zambesi were ceded to the league, which would thus be placed in the way of absorbing control, in the interest of all the civilized nations, of such regions as are not yet ready for autonomy. Thus the problem of imperialism, which must otherwise remain a stumbling block to democracy and an occasion of international strife, would find a solution.

Allied statesmanship will make tremendous demands upon the peoples before it has beaten the Central Powers into submission. Such demands imply a correlative obligation. It must be clear that the close of the war will usher in a new and better international epoch. The defeat of Germany, the reconstitution of relations among the peoples composing the Dual Monarchy, the dismemberment of Turkey are no doubt indispensable to any material improvement in international relations. Of themselves, however, they offer no adequate security to democracy. Security is to be had only through a form of international organization that has substantial benefits for those nations that participate in it. To effect such an organization will be a complicated task, to be sure. But it can not be undertaken too early if the Allied statesmen are to hold the confidence of democratic Russia and of the democratic classes of the other nations.

The Success of Selective Service

NOW that registration day is safely passed, there is no use in ignoring the fact that many governmental authorities have been in a panic about the success of conscription. American humor can be trusted to smile at the achievement of the secret service, which after days of sinister rumors about spies and plots succeeded in capturing two Columbia youths and a Barnard girl of accredited 1776 ancestry, who had issued an unlawful, but not very menacing circular. Yet a real danger exists not so much from "dark influences" and German spies, as from the political difficulties necessarily involved in applying for the first time so drastic a measure as conscription to a democratic nation waging the kind of war in which the United States has engaged.

France applied conscription rigorously and with little friction—to throw back a monstrous invading army which carried an immediate threat to every man, woman and child in her land. England, across the channel, fought for two years under the voluntary system and then installed conscription only after a bitter internal struggle. Australia, contrary to the promise of her premier, has returned a decisive vote against conscription for foreign service. Canada, whose volunteer armies have won glory the world over, does not yet dare to utilize conscription. The United States, spiritually more remote from the war than any of these democracies, adopted conscription before a single American regiment had set foot in France. The New Republic advocated the principle of selective service for this emergency, and believes as firmly as ever that it was wisely adopted. Yet a Congressional vote is not an incantation which exorcises all inherent difficulties in such a project. A determination to make everybody obey the law is, of course, neces-

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sary to any respectable government. But such a determination is far from being the only ingredient in wise administration. Conscription must be applied with a keen sense of our peculiar situation, and of democratic methods and purposes, or it may lead to political, and perhaps to military disaster.

A year ago most advocates of universal military service never suggested that it should be employed for anything except defense against invasion. It was assumed that every citizen would fight to protect his home, but it was not believed that every man would be willing to throw himself into the terrors of modern warfare for other purposes. When the United States entered the war most Americans expected that only a small force of soldiers would be needed abroad. The conscription bill was supported by the public largely for two reasons—first, that we ought to have an efficient army for our own protection in this crisis, second, that it was a scientific method of raising that army, one which would cause the least disturbance to the industries and agriculture forming our principal assistance to the Allies, one which would avoid the hate-mongering of a recruiting campaign. If at any time during the discussion it had been asserted that conscription was to be used as measure, not only of sending American soldiers to Europe, but of coercing unwilling minorities into the firing line, it would have been overwhelmingly defeated. No one can deny that there are minorities of Americans who, for various reasons, do not support this war. The New Republic has insisted from the beginning that the government in adopting conscription should show every consideration to conscientious objectors. This now appears all the more essential. We ought to have little difficulty, with less disturbance to industry than under the voluntary system, in selecting 500,000 or 1,000,000 young men who are willing, if necessary, to give their lives for present American purposes. Let this be done; let us not arouse the bitter internal dissension and petty local tyranny which would surely result from an attempt to coerce the men who for reasons of conscience claim exemption. Having adopted conscription for democratic purposes, let us not turn it into an instrument of tyranny.

A dangerous disposition exists in this respect throughout the country. Thousands of men of the more comfortable classes, who are not expected to fight abroad, have been formed into armed "home guards" for local protection. As auxiliaries to the police in their usual duties, as guards for factories and public works, these men are performing a valuable and necessary service. But talk with them about their possible duties, and it is not long before someone will mention "draft riots" and "strikes." He sometimes speaks with pleasure of the possible coercion of "slackers." He wants to send to the front parts of the population he dislikes. He assumes that local civil war is likely at any moment to break out. It is easy to imagine the disastrous internal situation to which such a disposition might lead unless the governments, national and local, use every possible means to avoid the necessity of repressive measures. Another source of danger lies in the operation of exemption boards. In some parts of the country these may be seized by local political machines, and used for partisan purposes, or they may give undue regard to "pull." In other places, where they are honestly administered, charges of dishonesty may be made. The only way to avoid trouble on this score is, first, to see to it that the boards contain trusted representatives of all important elements in the community, and, second, to adopt a liberal policy with regard to exemptions.

But apart from the details of administrative policy, the most important single element in the success of conscription is the morale of the country as a whole. There are always men who are eager to fight for their country in any cause whatsoever, men who would be as blindly loyal to the Kaiser if they happened to live in Germany as they are to their own government. But they are not enough to fill a national army. We must rely mainly on civilians by temperament, men who are loyal and will obey their government's orders, but still men who do not pretend to like killing other men, and who do not relish risking their own lives except for exalted purposes. Whether this kind of citizen is enthusiastic about the war or not must, in a democratic country, largely determine the military efficiency of a conscript army and the ultimate political effects of conscription. It is easy for a statesman at his desk to decide that the war must go on so much longer for such and such a territorial readjustment, but the man who is destined for the trenches must be sure he is fighting for something absolutely necessary. Where the danger from the enemy is at hand, he may be uncritical, but when the war is so remote as it is from us, it takes more than an unfurling of flags and a display of the customary patriotic window-setting to keep him long at a fighting pitch. He cannot be sustained by heated editorials in newspapers which have in the past angrily opposed almost every democratic movement. Hysterical speeches and extreme demands on the part of Allied statesmen can only dampen his ardor. Any insidious suspicion, fostered by the trend of diplomacy, that this is at bottom merely a war of prestige between competing imperial systems, will in time eat into his resolution. Not even

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Theodore Roosevelt can persuade Americans that they should sacrifice many of their boys to add German Africa to the British Empire or Kiao Chao to Japan. Flatly, the only rock on which we can found the American conscript army without a disastrous reaction is the conviction with which America entered the war. The organization of future peace, democratic purposes the world over—these are the only ends for which we can use all our energy. A minor war, carried on by volunteers, may be allowed to continue if the nation is not vigorously behind it. A war involving conscription makes more rigorous demands. This is just as true in America as it is in Russia. More interest in the future concert of nations, less interest in a redistribution of the balance of power, more interest in fundamental democratic aims, less interest in irredentas, colonies and punitive indemnities—this is what the American people, irrespective of their government, will surely expect of the Alliance if they are to be required for long to pour out the blood of their young men with the recklessness demanded by the most destructive war in history.

Where the College Has Succeeded

THE commencement season of this year will not be recorded in our college annals as one of exceptional joyousness. Ever since the declaration of war national events have thrown their huge shadow over academic life, making its values seem dim, its purposes obscure and wavering. The college president and the faculty as a collective abstraction have indeed been able to fall in plausibly behind the march of great events. It was possible to offer the student body for intensive drill, to enroll some of the teachers in the Officers' Reserve Corps, and to consign laboratories and workshops to the service of the nation at war. There was occasion for the large gesture of "placing all the resources of the institution, material, intellectual and moral, at the command of the President of the United States." Some of these resources, no doubt, were of immediate availability. But by the general grant, all the resources, for example, of the Greek and Latin Departments, of Logic, Epistemology, and Metaphysics, of Pure Mathematics and Applied Astronomy, were freely to be drawn upon by the nation in its desperate conflict with gigantic military autocracy. It is not difficult to conjure up an array of worthy teachers looking self-possessed but feeling like very thin and bankrupt spectres.

On first impression, the light thrown by war upon academic results is merely an intensification of the light thrown by the practical requirements of peace. Throughout the last two decades there has been a growing tendency among men of affairs to criticize the colleges on the ground that the training they offer is out of relation to life. The finished product of the colleges has been disparaged as mere raw material for business and the professions. In contrast, the German system of higher education has been persistently held up for our admiration. The German youth destined for business does not proceed in leisurely fashion through a general arts course. Careful thought is given by the faculties to his presumptive needs, and he knows exactly why he is pursuing a given study. The prospective surgeon does not wander at will through three or four years of an elective system. He is at work acquiring a scientific technique that will stand him in good stead in his early professional studies and later in his active practice. In consequence a mobilization for war of the German higher educational institutions produces a large proportion of experts, finished or in process. One group of students are fit for immediate service in the public offices as secretaries, accountants, etc. Another group are easily accommodated to the needs of the chemical industries in their wartime extension; another will prove useful in the nice determination of gauges and standards in the mechanical industries. All have the rudiments of an army officer's training.

Compared with such results, what showing do our colleges make under the stress of mobilization? Our technical courses yield men of some special competence. But the arts college can only offer young men who are mentally alert and eager to fit themselves for any work that may be assigned to them. Of differentiated competence there is little. Doesn't this fact emphasize the alleged weakness in our system?

Undifferentiated competence is the characteristic of American youth in general. In no older country is it so difficult to predict the future career of a typical schoolboy. The college preserves, for a select group, the condition of undifferentiation through the early years of manhood. Has this proved a disadvantage in peace, and will it be found to be a disadvantage in war? These questions are not easy to answer conclusively.

One who knows well the class of young men who graduate from our colleges will recognize certain common qualities that go far to explain the fact that after all, college men do as a rule succeed in life. Underneath their seeming self-complacency a close observer can detect a humility that makes them ready to begin at the bottom where promise of rising is in sight. They may have been dawdlers in college, content with a "gentleman's mediocrity," but they do not expect real life to surrender to any other force than hard work. They may have

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frowned upon the cultivation of exceptional talents in college, but they are painfully on the alert, upon graduation, to discover in themselves any inborn or acquired quality that may be made to count toward success. A group of college graduates may be raw material, but it is raw material infused with a very active spirit of life.

The American college succeeds in keeping its students mentally alert, but undifferentiated as to careers, several years beyond the point at which most German students have not only chosen their careers but have already laid a foundation for them. We seem to waste much time. And yet the achievements of later life seem not to convict us of real waste. In spite of later beginnings, the American business man will compare very well with the best of the Germans. The American surgeon and the American engineer, at their best, can not be matched by their German colleagues. It might almost appear that we are fortunate in having no very close coördination between college training and professional or business life. There are missing rungs in the ladder to success, to discourage the mediocre or ill adapted. With so perfectly devised a system as the German there is nothing to prevent the mediocre man, or the man whose talents are misapplied, from rising to the very top, provided that he is persistent and single minded. It is certain that many Germans holding positions of great distinction may be almost wholly explained in terms of the system and time. Personal quality appears as a negligible item.

The American college student, in so far as he works at all, is working with no direct consideration of personal gain. Latin A or Geology I are not expected to contribute to his success in whatever career he may pursue. And perhaps for this very reason the typical college produces a quite astonishing proportion of young men who will eagerly enlist for any work of public service. In the last two years colleges have proved the best field for recruiting young men for Ambulance service. Much of the early efficiency of American relief work in Belgium has been ascribed to a personnel consisting largely of men imbued with the college spirit. They worked incessantly, ardently, intelligently, with no thought of personal gain or credit. Naturally: our colleges swarm with men who would do likewise. Is this not a great deal to say for the colleges?

Now war is on, our colleges are doing their part. One of the conditions that the Germans counted on, when they decided to risk American intervention, was our notorious lack of officers to make effective our otherwise unlimited man power. They reckoned without our colleges. Here we have tens of thousands of young men, physically fit and mentally alert, willing to work harder than any other class of men in equipping themselves with the essentials of the military officer's art. They are not men who fret over the loss of a year or two that might be applied to their training as accountants or physicians or philologists. They have given years to undifferentiated culture and they are willing to give further years to the national service, not doubting that they will fit themselves satisfactorily into the scheme of practical affairs when the war is over. Therefore they have not hung back, waiting for the formal draft, but by thousands have applied themselves to the acquisition of military training with an energy to astonish and sadden their former teachers, in whose courses a zeal for work had not been conspicuous. Thanks to the colleges, we shall not lack material for officers when our body of recruits is forthcoming.

From the point of view of national military efficiency, then, the American college has succeeded. It has selected a body of young men who are available for the national service and it has animated them with a spirit that will make their services invaluable. And from the point of view of national efficiency in peace, the college, we shall probably come to realize better, has played its part successfully. Its methods have operated, more or less blindly to be sure, toward keeping vigorous the ideal of general adaptability which is perhaps the nation's greater asset.

The Price of Steel for Ships

THE foundation of the Shipping Board's new program of ship construction is steel. It was the apparent inability of the steel interests to promise deliveries within a reasonable period that at first made it seem necessary to rely on inferior wood construction. It was a change of front on the part of the steel manufacturers, and explicit promises of enough steel to build 3,000,000 tons of shipping within a year and a half, that induced the recent change from wood to steel. Henceforth, if we may judge from statements of General Goethals, and of members of Congress, our main hopes are to be staked on steel; wood is to be merely a side issue, to be pushed as vigorously as may be without interfering with the steel program.

The responsibility for this change is a staggering one, and it may be assumed that it was not made without the most searching consideration. If there has been a miscalculation, if the enthusiasm of the steel manufacturers has outstripped their judgment, if deliveries are delayed and the output of ships falls far short of the promise, the triumph of the

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Central Powers may be the price of the mistake. It is to be assumed that Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Gary, and Mr. Schwab have weighed the possibilities earnestly and anxiously, and that their promise rests on a genuine belief in their ability to perform.

Nevertheless complete confidence in the soundness of their decision can rest only on a conviction that it was rigorously impartial, that it was based exclusively on an estimate of the measure of disinterested service which the steel industry is capable of rendering. Unfortunately there have been disquieting rumors as to the price which the steel industry expects to exact for its services; and the soaring stock market quotations of United States Steel, since these rumors have made their appearance, lend to them an air of plausibility. It can hardly be a mere coincidence that steel common has advanced twenty points since the middle of May. In 1910 the Steel Corporation was selling steel plates at an average of about thirty-one dollars a ton. A thorough investigation of costs in steel production by the Commissioner of Corporations led to the conclusion that this price brought a return of ten and a half per cent on the investment. Since then, of course, costs have risen considerably, and to-day an impartial investigation would call for some revision of these figures, even as to steel made for the government, which it may be assumed is entitled in time of war to the best that its citizens can do. In practise, the government is now paying more than double the price which was in 1910 bringing such abundant returns. The figure fixed upon by Secretary Daniels for steel plate for the navy is sixty-five dollars a ton, and though this figure is attacked by steel manufacturers, it errs on the side of liberality.

The disquieting rumor which has apparently gained credence in Wall Street is that the Shipping Board will be expected to pay four and a quarter cents a pound for the steel plates to be used in its gigantic merchant fleet—a price that figures at more than ninety-five dollars a ton, more than three times the price in 1910, and nearly fifty per cent more than the present price for navy construction. No confirmation of this figure has been published, but its accuracy seems to be generally accepted. The Wall Street Journal, a publication known to have unusually good sources of information, stated definitely in a leading article last Monday that the price will be in round numbers a hundred dollars a ton.

It is hardly credible that far-sighted steel manufacturers of the type of Messrs. Gary, Schwab and Farrell should lend themselves to anything of this sort. At a time when the men of the country are being drafted into service, perhaps to be maimed or killed, for a paltry thirty dollars a month, it is inconceivable that the wealthiest industry in the United States should be willing thus to coin more riches out of the nation's peril. It would have a most sinister aspect. Socialists and radical labor leaders have for years preached to their followers that war was an institution designed by the capitalist class to enable it to extort more profits out of the sweat of labor; unrest among workingmen the world over has been predicated on the supposition that while human beings were drafted for war at nominal compensation, property was allowed to exact what the market would bring. Would not hundred-dollar steel look like a startling confirmation of this charge? Politically, such a thing would be suicidal. It would supply deadly ammunition to the western senators, such as LaFollette, who have maintained that the President plunged us into the war at the behest of the Wall Street interests.

The United States Steel Corporation and the other steel manufacturers have an opportunity, which will perhaps never return, of demonstrating that they place solicitude for the national safety and welfare above the desire for profit. They should be content to furnish steel to the government at the price already determined upon for navy work—at sixty-five dollars a ton. That is a fair, indeed a liberal price. Anything more savors of extortion. Under the new shipping legislation, the President has drastic and extensive commandeering power; he has a club which can make itself felt. But he should not be forced to use it. Ships cannot be rapidly built in an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism. The offer of steel at sixty-five dollars a ton should come from the steel interests, and it should be a voluntary one, made from a sense of public obligation. Let it be their contribution toward the prosecution of the war.

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War, the Constitution Moulder

THE concentration of power and responsibility demanded by war is apt to give a system grounded on the rigid maxims of republicanism a somewhat violent wrench. Fortunately the framers of the Constitution were not wholly unaware of the difficulty, which they proceeded to meet by conferring on the President as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy all the prerogatives of monarchy in connection with war-making except only the power to declare war and the power to create armed forces. The clause of the Constitution which makes the President Commander-in-Chief may accordingly be described as the elastic block in the closed circle of constitutionalism; in the heat of war the powers it confers are capable of expanding tremendously, but upon the restoration of normal conditions they shrink with equal rapidity. The true nature of the presidential prerogative in war time was comprehended by Lincoln perfectly, who, when he was confronted with the argument that some of his measures were likely to constitute precedents injurious to liberty, answered the objection in his characteristic strain: "Nor," said he, "am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the laws of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during a temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life." History has amply vindicated Lincoln's judgment in this matter, for the direct effect of the Civil War in the way of enlarging national power or of altering the relations of the different branches of the national government to one another was comparatively slight.

Will those of us who survive be able to say the same of the present war fifty years hence? Probably not, at any rate if the war is prolonged. For it requires no inordinate insight to recognize already the beginnings of what may well prove to be revolutionary developments in our system.

Despite much that has been said implying the contrary, it is extremely unlikely that our participation in the present war will exact of us sacrifices at all approaching those with which our forefathers met the war for the Union. But our participation will be for the most part, it seems probable, of a different order and so will produce different results. The Civil War was *war* in the most elementary sense of the term; our assistance to the Allies, even though we eventually send a considerable army abroad, must still be primarily financial and industrial. And this means the regimentation of industry and commerce on a national scale. It means, if Congress follows the President in this matter, lodging in the hands of the national executive the power to direct transportation, to control exports, to prevent—in the President's own words—"all unwarranted hoarding of every kind and the control of food stuffs by persons who are not in any legitimate sense producers, dealers, or traders," the power to requisition food supplies to meet public need, and the equipment necessary to handle them, the power to prohibit unnecessary and wasteful use of foods, and finally the power to fix maximum and minimum prices. No doubt, many of the measures suggested in the President's statement of Saturday, May 19th, which I have just paraphrased, will be of a purely emergency character, and so will pass out of existence with the war. Yet it is clear that for some of them, and for others of a similar nature, the way had already been paved both by industrial development and political agitation long before our entrance into the war had been thought of. Measures of this description look toward the permanent reshaping of both our governmental and our industrial systems, and the power upon which they rest will be relaxed only in part, if at all, with the return of peace.

This, however, is but the beginning of the changes which the war promises to engraft upon our constitutional arrangements. For the new faculties with which the national government will find itself endowed new channels must be provided or else existing channels must be enlarged. The latter is the more economical course, and already it is being resorted to. Moreover, we again perceive the stress of the immediate exigency striking hands with developments which were originally launched much earlier. In this connection it is interesting to refer to a paragraph in Mr. Wilson's own work, The State, in which he comments upon the administrative powers of the French executive in the following manner: "The Executive is expected to shape the laws to the cases that arise, and to supplement them where they lack completeness. The laws are, accordingly, for the most part themselves without detailed provisions. They give the officers of state, who are to execute them,

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a principle by which to go rather than a body of minute instructions." He also makes it clear that this way of legislating presents a distinct contrast to the English-American method.

But these words were written nearly thirty years ago. Since then Congress, influenced partly by a growing appreciation of its own inability to provide wisely for the multiple phases of the complex matters that to-day frequently fall within its regulating power, and partly by the rising reputation of the "scientific expert," has fallen more and more into the French way of proceeding. Thus it has authorized the Commerce Commission to fix "reasonable" maximum rates for interstate transportation; it has authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to say what varieties of tea are fit for importation; it has authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe regulations for governing the use of the public grazing lands; it has invested the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Shipping Board with the broadest kind of discretion within their several fields; and illustrations of the same character might be multiplied almost indefinitely. Such legislation plainly derogates from the principle of the separation of powers and the corollary doctrine that the legislature cannot delegate its powers. It had therefore, at first, a rather difficult gauntlet to run with the courts. But to-day the Federal Supreme Court at least has definitely yielded its scruples on these points, and will sustain such legislation simply on the score of necessity. (See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S.; and Grimaud v. U. S., 220 U. S.) Necessity, however, is at best a vague concept, and it is especially so in war time. One of the most conspicuous features, accordingly, of the legislation at present pending in Congress is the extent to which it relies upon executive discretion to supplement its provisions.

An even more striking possibility in the way of constitutional development than those just referred to is foreshadowed by section 6 of the Conscription act. This section authorizes the President "to utilize the services" not only of all officers and agents of the United States and territories, but of the several states as well, and it further provides that any person "who in any manner shall fail or neglect fully to perform any duty required of him in the execution of this act, shall, if not subject to military law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction in the District Court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year." Students of constitutional law will at once appreciate how radically these provisions transgress the principle of dual sovereignty which has hitherto underlain our federal system, a corollary of which is that the national government can impose legal duties upon state officers only with the consent of and upon the terms imposed by the states themselves. It was upon this principle that the first Fugitive Slave act was pronounced partially void in 1842 in the famous case of Prigg. v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., while a few years afterward the Court held, on the same ground, that the "duty" with which the governor of a state is charged by the act of 1793 in connection with the rendition of fugitives from justice is not a legally enforcible one (Ky. v. Dennison, 24 How.). The Conscription act is however vindicated to some degree by certain later utterances of the Court (see especially ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.), and at any rate it is clearly harmonious with the original intention of the Constitution. The younger Pinckney, speaking in this reference on the floor of the Philadelphia Convention, said: "They [the states] are the instruments upon which the Union must frequently depend for the support and execution of its powers." Then the Constitution itself requires an oath of fidelity from all state officers, commenting upon which fact, Hamilton wrote in the Federalist as follows: "Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates of the respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends, and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws." An interesting possibility is thus suggested: that, as the states diminish in importance in the legislative field, through the extension of congressional power, they may be afforded an opportunity to justify their continued existence in the capacity of administrative agents of the national government, and so our dual system would be gradually replaced by a federal system approximating to the German and Swiss type.

The general bearing of some other developments of the moment is not so easily perceived. What, for instance, will be the ultimate fate of such unofficial bodies as the Council of National Defense—are they merely "sports" which the body politic has put forth under an extraordinary stimulus and destined therefore to wither away when this stimulus is removed, or are they true species, the beginnings of valuable institutions? Again, what will be the permanent outcome of the President's notable efforts these days at "common counsel" with the congressional leaders—will they be likely to pave the way for the gradual displacement of the Cabinet in the American sense with a Cabinet in the British sense? Yet again, there is the ever-present question of budgetary reform. Must not the government's increasing resort to those forms of taxation which are most directly

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burdensome to the taxpayer bring this problem evermore to the front? And will not the recent reform of the Senate's rules, forced from the White House, have a similar tendency? To be sure, the practice of doing business by unanimous consent sometimes thwarted the congressional log-rollers, as where an individual Senator or two held up a Rivers and Harbors bill at the end of the session; but ordinarily it promoted it, by giving disgruntled seekers after "pork" in the House a second chance to force their demands through friends in the upper chamber. Now, however, this opportunity for blackmail is at an end, together with the special defense that has hitherto existed against the worst scandals of logrolling. In both ways the case for executive budget-making will be considerably strengthened with Congress itself.

Thus war has overtaken us at a peculiarly favorable moment for effecting lasting constitutional changes. For several years forces have been accumulating behind the barriers of the old Constitution, straining and weakening them at many points, yet without finding adequate enlargement. Where the stress of war falls coincident with such forces we may expect it to thrust aside accepted principles, not for the time only, but permanently. Certainly if the war is considerably prolonged, we may expect our system to emerge from it substantially altered in numerous ways, with the result, however, it may be, of postponing more radical alterations many years.

EDWARD S. CORWIN.

The Future of Religion

WILL religion revive after the war? Is it reviving already? Those are questions which are often asked, and are answered in accordance with the desires of the answerer, for we are all really optimists, and believe that the new age will see the fulfilment of our wishes. It cannot be otherwise; and I recognize for myself that all that I have to say is colored by this optimism. Yet optimism does not cover everything, and though I would gladly extend it not only to religion, but also to the churches, I can not quite achieve this attitude; so that while I am unreservedly optimistic about religion, as I understand it, I am pessimistic about the present attitude and the future fate of the churches.

What do we mean by religion? It is obviously neither morality nor theology; but at the same time it cannot exist long or satisfactorily without them. In itself it is the conscious wish and effort of man to be right in his relation to "ultimates"; even though these are perhaps never really what the name would claim, for each generation enlarges the circle of vision of which they are the circumference.

If religion be left at this point, which is possible, it remains entirely theoretic, but normally the man who is inspired by the desire to see ultimates and to stand right with them, is bound to revise his standards, both of conduct and of thought, in their light. By the revision of the one he produces a system of ethics based on religion, and by the revision of the other an intelligent and intelligible account of the relation of religion to things in general, thus producing a system of theology. Thus, though ethics need not be based on religion, religion is sure to result in ethics, and though theology may be based on metaphysics rather than on religion, religion cannot exist without creating or revising theology. It is for this reason that religion, ethics and theology are distinct but inseparable.

The "ultimate" thing which appeals most to this generation is the "purposefulness" of life. This was recently discovered by Mr. Wells, who wrote about it in The New Republic, though the discovery was not so recent as he seems to think, for almost all that he said was already implied in his Anticipations and, less clearly, in the last chapter of Tono Bungay. But Mr. Wells is not alone, for the same discovery has been made by many of us who come into somewhat intimate contact with the most intelligent and best-educated youth of to-day.

The thing which young men and women are seeing very clearly is that life is dominated by a great purpose. The fulness of it is not clear, nor do we always see it; but we know, perhaps better than we can express, its general character, and the direction in which it leads, so that the "venture of faith" consists in subordinating our own wills to this great purpose. I submit that this is religion: and I cannot agree with Mr. Wells that it has been produced by the war, though the war has quickened it in some minds. It has been produced by the call of modern life in general.

One might suppose that this would lead to a great strengthening of organized religion and of the Christian churches: but it is unfortunately not so. For the type of youth who thinks and feels thus sometimes rejects the name of religion, and sometimes is told by those who control the organization of the churches that he has no right to it.

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The reason given is that religion means conscious loyalty to a personal God, and it is said that the type of mind under discussion rejects this. Those who say this are often ministers of religion but nevertheless they are tragically ignorant of the history of religious thought. What they seem to mean is loyalty to a God outside the universe which he created, playing as it were tricks with it, in alternating moments of superhuman love and infra-human wrath. He has unlimited power, but he does not use it to prevent evil. He does not consist of flesh and blood, but he has that kind of attenuatedly material existence which is ordinarily ascribed to ghosts. Those who think thus seem entirely to have forgotten, or never to have learned, that this sort of God, though imaginable —just as the monsters of a nightmare are imaginable—is not conceivable by a rational mind; and that on the other hand the only God who is conceivable, though not imaginable, is immaterial, belonging to that world of immaterial reality which is known to the abstract mathematician and metaphysician. There is a sense in which personality can and ought to be ascribed to this immaterial reality, but it is not the sense in which the word is popularly used. In popular language personality means anthropomorphic individuality and seems to imply the limitations of life by human conditions quite as much as its expression. To believe that God has this kind of personality is not orthodox; it is not even heretical; it is merely heathenism of an inferior type.

If, however, personal be taken to mean the recognition that in our experience intelligent life is on a higher plane than mechanical existence, immaterial reality can properly be called personal. This is classically orthodox, though it must be remembered that the exact phrase "a personal God" scarcely belongs to the great period of formative Christian theology. (If any doubt this let them try to translate "a personal God" into Greek. The nearest approach seems to be ὁ ζῶν Θεὸς).

It is this immaterial reality so well known to Greek theologians which the modern man has rediscovered or in which he has discovered a new aspect. He desires to order his life aright in relation to it. He knows that to neglect its laws is the way of intellectual and spiritual death, just as surely as to neglect the laws of material reality is the way of physical death. That is religion. And in this reality the side which the modern man sees more plainly than anything else is its purposefulness. It is therefore a tragedy that, though in many ways this is, judged by the classical standards of theology alluded to above, a profoundly orthodox position, the modern world is so ignorant of theology that the ordinary religious speaker regards it as heretical and the ordinary scientific man accepts the verdict and agrees to regard himself in this light.

At the same time this kind of religion is not a revival of anything; it is in some ways new, differing from any classical presentation, so that it is worth asking exactly where the difference enters. It is in the main not in the conception of God—in that Athanasius would find more in common with modern men of science than with modern popular preachers—but in the view taken of the relation between ordinary life and religious life.

In early or medieval thought the belief obtained that religion was something added on to life. A man might do his work well and be a good and useful member of society; but unless he was religious and did the extra things which religion demanded, he was a lost soul. This is the implication of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Religion was an "extra" thing, controlled by a supernatural society, by which men gained salvation, without which they could not stand right with God. A man could not attain to it by himself, for it was not part of ordinary life, but different from it and more important. The less instructed a man was, the more true would be this statement of his views, but no one, not even Origen or Saint Thomas Aquinas, was free from it. Now the situation is changed; religion is valued as a part of ordinary life, so far as it makes men good citizens, and the whole idea of salvation by some appendix to life, controlled by some special class, is in abeyance and to most of us repugnant. We agree with the poet, though perhaps not in his sense, that "the daily round, the common task, will furnish all we need to ask."

But even in the doctrine concerning God there is a change. The ancient idea of Immaterial Reality, which is God, emphasized all those attributes of fixity and changelessness which undoubtedly belong to any reasonable concept of it. The main difficulty of ancient theologians was to bring this God into relation with the world, as daily observation reveals it. Their God was static perfection, and the problem was to explain imperfect and changing creation in relation to him. The modern man, on the other hand, begins by accepting what the ancients found difficult. He sees more clearly than anything else the dynamic and evolving nature of reality; the purpose which he recognizes in God, or as God, is not so much a goal, which will some day be reached, as a pattern which is being constantly evolved, always regular, balanced, and beautiful, but never finished, and, so far as he can see, probably infinite. He doubts all traditional

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statements as to what God did in the beginning or will do in the end, because he doubts, not God, but the human mind which speaks of beginning and end.

Once more I would repeat that this is religion. It is the real thing; and the religious nature of the whole mind of the modern man is being revealed to the student of historical theology, as he sees how, in war and in peace, men subordinate their own interests to those of some higher aim in which, express it how they may, they find the true purpose of life. Therefore that this is religion I do not doubt; but whether it will officially retain that name is another question. It is remarkable that Bernard Shaw, in expressing much this point through the mouth of Andrew Undershaft, did not allow him to describe himself as religious but as mystical. I am inclined to think that quite possibly ecclesiastical orthodoxy will refuse to allow the name of religion to be applied to the reality, and will insist on reserving it for obsolete theories invented in past generations to explain religion, and now intellectually indefensible. For, sad to say, if in the language of St. Luke we ask, "If the Son of Man come, will he find faith in the earth?" we are forced to admit that faith is to be found almost anywhere except in the leaders of the churches.

Faith is not the antithesis of doubt, which is only another name for intelligence, but of timidity. It is the power which leads men to go on, knowing that that which is beyond is good, and trusting themselves to the guidance of life. It means forgetting the things which are behind and reaching out to the things which are before. In his own sphere the business man of to-day has done this; in his own very different sphere the man of science has done this. To continue in biblical language, they have used the talents entrusted to them and need not be afraid to stand before the Son of Man.

But the professional ecclesiastic has insisted on keeping his talent unchanged, removed from the commerce of the market, and the time is approaching when it will be taken from him and be given to others; he himself will retain merely the hole in the ground in which he once hid it. He may continue to call that hole religion or God or Christianity or anything which he likes, and perhaps he will be allowed by others to do so, for men who are in earnest have little time and small inclination to contend about words. But the reality will be elsewhere, even if it be under another name, and the children of the new age will follow the reality, not the name.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

An Experiment in Hours

LONG before the Bunting decision of April 9th established the constitutionality of the Oregon Ten Hour law, the case for the shorter work day was decided by public opinion. This long awaited decision of the federal Supreme Court, coming after a year of unexampled progress in shorter hours, offers a striking example of how far the law lags behind the operation of concrete fact and practice. From all over the country, while the decision was pending, reports have come in of the victory of shorter hours. For some 350,000 workers during the past year the shorter workday has become an established fact, and only last December Mr. George F. Johnson of the great Johnson-Endicott Shoe Company summed up the nation's mood with "We think the eight-hour day has arrived."

Now with the first blast of war, these hard-won industrial gains threaten to crumble. America has yet to prove whether her economic house, like England's, was built on sand. On all sides we are faced with the break-down of the labor law. When life itself is freely thrown into the balance, people reason, why should we hesitate at the health and strength of labor? Like the army in the field, the industrial army must be mobilized and must take its chances. And labor in war time, here as in England, will go to any length of patriotic sacrifice. But a spurt at the outset is no good promise for victory in a long race, and the race, as experts tell us, may be a long one. The winning of the war may well depend on the degree of America's industrial efficiency. What will best maintain that efficiency at its maximum? Just at this time when we supremely need the cool sanity of science, comes news of one of the most interesting scientific experiments in shorter hours ever conducted in this country.

At the beginning of December last the W. H. McElwain Company of Boston, employing some 7,000 men, was reported to have reduced its working week from fifty-five to fifty-two hours. No explanation was offered except the brief managerial comment, "It was felt by the Directors to be wise business policy." Now, after four months' trial of the new system, the brief comment of December has been supplemented by a detailed statement of its working and its results. It is hardly possible to praise the clarity and scientific temper of this report too highly. On its showing it is scarcely too much to say that the McElwain experiment, in scientific precision and completeness, deserves to take rank among the "classic experiments" of industry; with the famous experiment in shorter hours of Ernst Abbe at the Zeiss Optical

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Works or that of M. Fromont at the Engis Chemical Works in Belgium.

The flaw in most of the experiments made in shorter hours is the absence of exact records or some change in conditions for which it is impossible to make accurate allowance. New methods or new machinery are introduced to recoup the expected loss in production, more men perhaps are taken on, time-keeping becomes more rigid, or in some other way the conditions change after the change of hours. But the McElwain Company's statement gives us an example of the controlled experiment almost as perfect as any in a scientific laboratory. Thus in December, 1916, when the new time scheme was introduced, production was at its maximum and had indeed reached a point higher than in any previous period; the maximum number of machines was installed; 95 per cent of the productive payroll was on standardized piece rates; the routing system was running so smoothly that delays for lack of work were practically zero; and the "standard production load" was such that full time was always worked, with occasional overtime in some few departments. At the time of the change there was no alteration in the character of the product and no new machines or new processes tending to increase per capita output were being installed. Such few changes indeed as were in process "would tend," says the firm's statement, "to increase slightly the productive difficulty of the product."

When under such conditions the fifty-two hour week was introduced in the seven shoe factories with their subsidiary supply plants that constitute the big McElwain system, it was decided to keep the previous standard production rate, and, after trial, to fix any reduction that might prove necessary. *There has been no reduction whatever.* Four months' experience has proved the fear of lowered production groundless. Actual production has never declined. No department and no factory has dropped below the standard rate. Indeed, the Planning Manager tells us that, in spite of unusual outside difficulties such as shortage of material and delays in transportation, in the ten years of his work with the company he has at no time had so little trouble with production as in the winter of 1916-1917.

The case for the shorter workday would seem by this experience to be proved once more in so far as the question is one of reassurance against business loss. But the writer of the report goes further, and follows his figures on the maintenance of standard rates with an even more striking table. Taking his data from the actual records of the firm for the last six months he finds that the daily production unit per employee not only did not decline between October, 1916, and March, 1917; it actually increased. Against the common experience that leads us to expect after a reduction of hours a temporary drop in production followed by a recovery and slight ultimate rise, the two months immediately following the change showed no drop at all, but the marked increase of .09 in the production unit per employee, and the next two months .02 more. Whereas according to the old mathematical economics, the loss of one-half hour's daily work should have pulled down the production unit per man by .52, it raised it, as a matter of recorded fact, by .11. And this record was made, it should be stated, in spite of the fact that "several bad epidemics of colds and grippe" tended to decrease production during the winter months through absence.

Period	Total Number of Employees.	Production Unit Per Employee Per Day Based on Pairs Shipped.
Oct. and Nov. '16 (Working 55 Hours)	3986	8.91
Dec. '16 and Jan. '17 (Working 52 Hours)	4105	9.00
Feb. and Mar. '17 (Working 52 Hours)	4170	9.02

"Long working hours are not only an economic loss to the community as a whole," the report sums up. . . . "Even inside factory walls there is no net profit in running on a schedule of much over eight and one-half hours per day. . . . *The old theory of proportional production per hour is absolutely untenable.*"

The truth of machines cannot be the truth of living men. The paradox that seemed so preposterous to the early economists, that shorter hours may mean larger output and that long hours defeat their own end, has become in our hundred years' war for human progress the commonplace of the scientific manager. We can disregard it only at our peril.

The air to-day is full of warning voices. We are deaf to many of them. We can hear England's asking us, now when she needs us most, not to make her pay the price of industrial unwisdom a second time. No war can repeal the laws of physiology; on them in the last analysis depends production. Overstrain, in cold figures, does not pay. Even in her national emergency England had to pay for it in lowered efficiency and failing output. Overtime, say the reports of British experts, is *physiologically and therefore economically extravagant.* Here in America we have never needed maximum output so much as now, and maximum output is attained only by fresh and vigorous workers.

MARY D. HOPKINS.

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The Professor

"ANOTHER Professor Goes Bang," announced a well known western newspaper editorially the other day, apropos of a difference of opinion between the journal and the unfortunate collegian. Another *professor,* you observe; another specimen of the tribe, not an individual. Another near-sighted fellow, wrinkled in forehead and clothing, morose or dreamily amiable, as learned in non-essentials as he is lacking in judgment concerning the ordinary affairs of life. When shall the day come in which the professor will be regarded as an individual, like other men—not as a member of a class? The typical lawyer, the typical editor, the typical business man, dwell nowhere in imagination, but the typical professor is clear to the mind of millions. The body of Ichabod Crane was never found, but his soul, according to popular conception, goes marching on among a thousand faculties. President Wilson can never live down his professorial past; hundreds of thousands of votes were cast against him, in the intellectually rural districts of New York and elsewhere, because he had once learned enough about history to be able to make it clear to others. Not that the voters knew or cared what branch of learning he had climbed upon; he had been a professor, and that classified him.

The sources of what might be called the professorial legend are, I suppose, two. One takes its rise in the recollections of the undergraduate, and overflows the fields of business. Most students who do not themselves expect to enter a profession are in college for amusement only—amusement, and the advancement in life that comes from making pleasant or influential acquaintances. Such boys look upon any demand for exact special knowledge, or upon abstract speculation, as the vagary of one quite alien to their existence. Why should a real man think, when action is so much easier and more natural? The little daily irritation of such a demand made upon them by the professor they can forgive, of course, because to poke them up is his peculiar business, and the pole is after all without great difficulty avoided; but what shall be said of the demands made by the professor upon himself? Life is vital; why inquire into the structure of turnips, from which it is proverbially certain blood can not be had? Truly, an interest in the rocks is more comprehensible than in the Rossettis, because the undergraduate knows there are rocks; but even the geologist is a queer duck, thinks the future bond salesman. And so he goes into the world of affairs, and honorably estimates his eighths, and cunningly calculates his chances, and achieves his ten thousand or his twenty thousand a year, and builds his garage, and with justifiable self-satisfaction gives his annual hundred dollars to the Society for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor, and another hundred to the alumni fund for increasing the salaries of the professors, with the same wonder in each case why it is that so many fail to get on in the world. And from him the ordinary view of the professor spreads out into the community.

The other source is the newspaper. Any public comment by any one of the slightest reputation on any matter of general interest is of course "news." Now the professor, discussing with his class socialism or scientific discoveries, literature or vital statistics, is certain sooner or later to say something which can be twisted into such a comment. And as he has given more consideration to the question than ninety-nine out of a hundred in the community, his idea may very likely even have elements of novelty. "Another Professor Goes Bang." But such elements of novelty are not essential. I once had a colleague who remarked in the class room that the value of most hymns lay in their associations; literary charm few of them possessed. This is a statement of fact, having much the same thrilling interest that is to be got from a single star in Baedeker. But the newspapers from Maine to California reported the comment, garbled it, ridiculed it. Another colleague ventured the declaration, in response to a student's question, that in his opinion the story of Adam and Eve in the garden should be regarded rather as a contribution to literature than to history. From the volumes of editorial criticisms of his point of view, one sentence remains in his memory. "Since Darwin's Origin of Species no such daring and brutal attack has been made upon the foundations of Christianity."

As a matter of fact, what *are* professors? Members of the community who having expert knowledge in a particular field, attempt, upon request, to interest and to inform others. As social beings, some are dull, some delightful. The average of delightfulness is low, of dulness perhaps still lower. Their tendency is to acridity. One wrote once upon a "theme" of a friend of mine, "Your vocabulary is mean and poor, but amply sufficient for the expression of your ideas." To another a proud youth remarked, "I have spent ten years upon my education." "Prodigal!" Such savagery comes not from faults in early education, but from a corrosive consciousness of the handicap they labor under. In all other professions, except the clerical, intelligence and ambition run together unhampered to the goal; but the American professor shuffles forward in the sack of tradition. He carries his wares to a dead market. He shoots at a

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small target, and often misses though his aim is keen. Knowing these things, what wonder if he sometimes sneers? A little tired, a little soiled, a little sour, he journeys uphill to the very end.

The professor's occupation, also, handicaps him socially, when he moves outside his own group, because it tends to isolate his interests from the usual affairs of men. His shop-talk is often incomprehensible. Paleontology or pragmatism, Tacitus or tone-color, are thrilling in a study over a pipe, but they look very hazy when seen through the smoke of after-dinner coronas. Of course this general statement is not true of men in all departments. Psychologists, for instance, have in recent years emerged from their scientific isolation, and crowded into the market-place; we have courses in the "psychology of advertising" now, and even the "psychology of business experience," and the psychologist, looked on by the manufacturer or the department-store manager with the same eager wistful half-belief that kings of old showed toward the alchemists, may talk shop anywhere with an assurance of attention. But his case is the exception; when not long ago in Chicago Theodore Roosevelt dined with one professor and called on another, his eccentricity was accepted as another proof of the many-sidedness of the most versatile of our ex-Presidents.

Socially, moreover, the professor tends to a very bad fault—verbosity. Accustomed to the mind of youth, which is alert but singularly unretentive, he makes his point again and yet again until his vis-à-vis would fain drop into a defensive doze. He brings this habit into "faculty meetings" also. Probably, with all due deference to Congress, the world's worst speeches are made in faculty meetings. Round and round rolls the little ball of thought, never dropping into a pocket; the slogan is, "That is to say."

Yet in spite of his verbosity, he is not as a rule more dogmatic than other men. He is, if anything, too receptive, too hospitable to points of view. Your man of affairs holds a court-reception for opinion; they must be vouched for, and come in uniform, or they will be turned away from his ante-room. Not so the professor. His latch-string is always out; his mind a cave of Adullam. It is this intellectual hospitality which has in late years bred so much discussion of his right to freedom of speech. Yet he keeps order among his guests; they seldom issue forth again, disturbers of the peace. The defect of this toleration, indeed, is the professor's tendency to regard no philosophy as of paramount importance. The pacifist may be dangerous and the militarist stupid, but what of the man who takes only an amused interest in any proposed solution of the problem? But in that position stand, we fancy, a larger proportion of the professors than of any other group in the community. The Reverend William Sunday asserts a similar indifference on their part toward religion, and he is not a man to speak recklessly. Even in this academic tolerance, however, which is perhaps as typical as anything professorial, there is no regularity; the fiercest fanatic I ever knew, and the gentlest cynic, were professors. I often think of these two when I encounter that classification, that implicit denial of individuality, to which I referred at the beginning of my article. Back to back they stood; their only common ground the necessity of preserving the dignity of a diplomat on the salary of a postman, and the ability to play a very fair game of golf; stretching out otherwise their lines of thought in absolutely opposite directions into the universe.

JAMES WEBER LINN.

A COMMUNICATION

The Duty of Americans of German Descent

SIR: To the American people of German descent the preceding two years have been full of heartaches and desolated by shattered ideals. Their hearts were torn with conflicting emotions, for in some communities during the first outburst of indignation against Germany, the whole German race was declared to be a curse to the world and every individual became an object of execration. During these hours of despair and painful loss the German soul felt that it was the hunted of the earth, the cursed whom every man sought to destroy.

In his inner consciousness the German condemned the spirit and acts of the German government, but he often feared to confess it to the world, for he wished to believe his race was still imbued with the ideals of peace. He dared not admit they were entirely wrong without placing the brand of Cain upon himself also. He tried to explain the necessities of some actions in war and to disbelieve the acts too abhorrent for justification. It was necessary to maintain the moral and spiritual position of the German people; his self-respect demanded it during the time his race was the object of public condemnation. Only by degrees did the Americans of German descent perceive that the German government and the German people were to be distinguished from each other. Some had said it timidly, but the world did not heed their remarks until President Wilson so eloquently stated the same idea. With deep insight the President had expressed the issue which Germans should have emphasized long before.

At last the situation appeared in its true light. There was a great Germany before the war peacefully leading the world in many fields of human endeavor, an honest, industrious people who loved peace and had toiled long and earnestly to make their land produce the meagre necessities of their simple life. But back of it all was a pernicious, insidious group of men, a remnant of the earth's dark ages,

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who sought only to utilize the attainments of the German people to further their selfish interests. The German people trusted their government and without any feeling of human sympathy or remorse the German government offered up its people as a sacrifice to gain its ends.

Whatever may have been the primary object of this war men's lives are no longer being sacrificed to attain it. President Wilson had waited patiently for the time when the new issue could be stated clearly and concisely. To do this required the tactful education of the American people and an expression of democracy from the Allies. Europe had many conflicting aims, but we have had but one; and the President in his message clearly defined it; Democracy. Our ideals are to be fulfilled, America stands for a world federation, for the establishment of perpetual peace and freedom for the oppressed of every land. This war is for the liberation of man and not to crush the German people. Once we see it in this light the seas of human blood will not have been shed in vain and every drop will be the benediction of a happier day on earth.

Americans of German descent must distinguish clearly between the German government and the German people in extending their sympathy. They have not always done so in the past. Why did Germans come to America and what were their ideals? They were Americans in spirit before they reached the shores of America. They sought freedom and equality and they severed their connections with the German government to obtain it. These people have always been opposed to the spirit of the German government and they must not cease to oppose it now. Carl Schurz typified the spirit of the Germans who came to America. He could not endure the stifling air of Germany. Shall we who have enjoyed a life and land of freedom be friendly to a government that despises liberty and equality; shall we not earnestly strive to purge modern civilization of this feudal system?

Americans of German descent will welcome the day when Germany is free. The work which the fathers of '48 so longed to fulfil, it is now our privilege to accomplish. We must let the people of Germany know why we have entered this momentous struggle. We must let them know that every man of German blood in America is ready to give his life to free them from the German government. We must convince them we do this of our free will because we know we are doing right. We bring liberty. How can the German people distrust the motives of Americans, especially those of German descent? They will believe us if we state our ideas emphatically. Our unity will hasten the day when the German people will feel strong enough to strike off their chains and end this disastrous war.

To carry out the ideals of democracy we bring no desire of conquest, only the beacon light of a greater humanity. As a free people we shall never fight to crush a nation or to enslave it. The German people must be convinced of this and they will be if every American of German descent stands unreservedly for the destruction of the German government, and the principles of the message of Woodrow Wilson to the Congress of the United States. Let us proclaim our devotion and our ideals that every hamlet and every home in Germany may hear. The influence of our great country will lead the Allies to espouse more fully the cause of democracy and a nobler peace. In 1776 America brought forth a nation endowed with liberty and consecrated to justice; but now she will bring forth a world. It is our privilege to share in so sacred a task.

AN AMERICAN OF GERMAN DESCENT.

CORRESPONDENCE

Income Tax Rates and the Loan

SIR: The editorial notes of The New Republic of May 22nd contain the following sentence:

"They (tax-exempt bonds) yield so little that not even the income taxpayer who is subject to the highest rates can afford to exchange 6 per cent investments for them, besides their volume is relatively small as compared with fortunes that will be heavily taxed."

May I be permitted to observe that the yield of tax-exempt securities at prevailing prices ranges from 3½ per cent to nearly 4½ per cent. Under the rates fixed in the War Revenue bill as it passed the House of Representatives a taxable 6 per cent investment would yield:

4.20%	on	incomes	over	$100,000	per	annum
3.90%	"	"	"	150,000	"	"
3.54%	"	"	"	200,000	"	"
3.26%	"	"	"	250,000	"	"
2.97%	"	"	"	300,000	"	"
2.69%	"	"	"	500,000	"	"
2.40%	"	"	"	1,000,000	"	"
2.34%	"	"	"	1,500,000	"	"
2.28%	"	"	"	2,000,000	"	"

Or, to put it in another way, the investment in 3½ per cent Liberty Bonds is thus equivalent to investing in a taxable security yielding:

5.02%	in	respect	of	incomes	over	$100,000 per annum
5.38%	"	"	"	"	150,000	" "
5.93%	"	"	"	"	200,000	" "
6.45%	"	"	"	"	250,000	" "
7.07%	"	"	"	"	300,000	" "
7.82%	"	"	"	"	500,000	" "
8.75%	"	"	"	"	1,000,000	" "
8.97%	"	"	"	"	1,500,000	" "
9.21%	"	"	"	"	2,000,000	" "

The investment in, say, New York City Bonds—being tax-exempt—at their present yield of 4.20 per cent, would represent the following rates of income as compared to investments in taxable securities:

6.02%	in	respect	of	incomes	over	$100,000 per annum
6.46%	"	"	"	"	150,000	" "
7.12%	"	"	"	"	200,000	" "
7.74%	"	"	"	"	250,000	" "
8.48%	"	"	"	"	300,000	" "
9.38%	"	"	"	"	500,000	" "
10.50%	"	"	"	"	1,000,000	" "
10.76%	"	"	"	"	1,500,000	" "
11.05%	"	"	"	"	2,000,000	" "

The ability of corporations to find a ready market for their securities is a pre-requisite for the continuance of business prosperity or, indeed, of adequate business activity. I need not elaborate the effect which the comparison of the

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income yield from tax-exempt securities as against taxable securities under an excessively high income tax schedule—even if confined to larger incomes—must necessarily have upon the eligibility of corporate securities for investment purposes. The conclusion seems unescapable that the resulting degree of disinclination to invest in such securities coupled with the impulse to dispose of existing holdings would bring about liquidation, severe shrinkage of values and more or less pronounced demoralization in the investment market—a condition of things which could not fail in a measure to affect adversely the country's business in general, and which could only partially be counteracted by government expenditures, however large.

The volume of tax-exempt securities at present outstanding, including the new Liberty Loan, is estimated at not less than $8,000,000,000.

I fully agree with you, that to permit "mushroom fortunes to be built" out of war profits is "sheer fiscal stupidity" and "socially inexpedient as well." I believe that a considerable excess war profits tax on the English model upon a fair and well conceived average basis of earnings (taking account of the vast difference in the country's industrial plant to-day and before the European war), together with a reasonably heavy income tax, would to a great extent avoid this, without affecting wages or diminishing the enterprise and business activities of the country.

O. H. KAHN.

New York City.

Questions about China

SIR: May I address you a few words concerning a point of the American diplomacy in Pekin? To express my opinion, I base several private letters from my friends at home and the news items of the press recently cabled from Pekin. The content of the news seems to verify what I learned through individual sources and to be important enough to warrant a discussion.

I understand the American Minister, Dr. Reinsch, has been urging the Pekin Government to join the war although I have no knowledge of the fact whether or not he acted independently. Then, instead of approaching the government through the ordinary channel, he proceeded to deal, directly or indirectly I cannot say, with the militarists; and it has been reported that he even suggested to them the idea of revolt against President Li Yuan Hung in the event that he refuses to sanction war. This procedure seems to have been adopted since a recent dispatch from Pekin stated that he gave a reception at the American Legation to the Generals who were called to Pekin to "discuss" the question of war with Premier Tuan, head of the military autocracy.

Many questions may arise from this summary of reports. Space does not permit me to consider them. One question, however, seems to deserve a very serious comment and must be stated. That is: What will be the effect of the procedure he adopted upon the development of democracy in China? Does it not encourage the military autocrats to act at their own will?

Since the late Yuan Shih Kai became the President of China, the road chosen to advance to a republican form of government has been dangerous to the life of China itself. That road has been designated as "the strong man's road" or the road of force—a force neither moral nor intellectual, but ignorant and autocratic. Its structure has been officialdom; its pavement, the army and navy; its guides, the generals of the imperial "heredity." It was these generals who divided China into South and North in loyalty, brought about the Second Revolution, defeated the republicans, and supported the ambition and tyranny of Yuan Shih Kai. It is because of their interference with the government and politics that no political party and hence no political policy can be established for action. They are responsible more than any other element of the Chinese population for disorder, destruction and retrogression. They constitute the most dangerous obstacle to institute the New Order because whatever the civilians decide to do can be blocked by them and their rejection or approval must be the final. Moreover, to be sure, the trouble with them is that they have no education, no training, no foresight, no patriotism as, for example, the Prussian Junkers have. With them there can be no hope for construction and creation in China. It is therefore astonishing to hear that the American Minister, well-informed as he is, should rely on them in the war to defend democracy and to secure peace on earth. It is doubtful whether the goal he desires can be realized and it seems to be certain that the military parties (in name there is none but in fact there are at least two) will usurp more and more powers and bring further ruins unto the Chinese people.

Whether China should join the Allies is a debatable question. Personally, I have been favoring positive actions since the August of 1914. In any event it is far better to deal with the Chinese civilians, and now in view of the interdependence of nations, it is advisable to urge the Pekin government to send a commission immediately to this Republic, the leader of the democratic forces versus the autocratic. I hope the American diplomacy in Pekin will not be so "radical" as to contradict the American policy.

H. H. LI.

University of Pennsylvania.

Don't Forget Education

SIR: The present very marked disorganization of college classes throughout the country has been accompanied by a very great falling off in the attendance in public and private schools. It seems timely to suggest that unless the organization of secondary education is maintained to an appreciable extent and the integrity of its courses preserved, there will be in a very few years a very serious shortage of men and women qualified to do the work which circumstances will force upon the nation. Well equipped doctors, engineers of all kinds, chemists, food experts and men and women trained in all the productive arts will be imperatively demanded here and elsewhere. Lack of preparation and immaturity will be a fatal drawback in meeting the exigencies of the near future. Too serious an inroad on the source of supply must not be made at this time. Too many disorganizing influences must not be allowed to work at one time on the schools. More rather than less serious attention must be given just now to secondary education, and school courses must be so shaped as to make for the highest industrial productiveness. The laboratory equipment of the American high schools alone affords splendid opportunities for work in this direction. The American high schools are a factor to reckon with. No stone should be left unturned to make this resource of national power effective.

VINCENT B. BRECHT.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

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Books and Things

HOW does the Oxford University Press contrive to sell such well made books at such low prices? Here comes, for instance, from its American Branch, 35 West 32d Street, New York, Number 213 in the World's Classics. For forty-five cents you can buy this bit of sound workmanship and put it in your pocket, well printed by the Clarks of Edinburgh, and pleasantly bound in dark green cloth. Is there any other series, except Mr. Dent's Temple Classics, that contains books so agreeable and so cheap?

Number 213 is a translation of Nekrassov's famous poem, Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia? Famous, I mean, in Russia itself, for in the United States I suppose Nekrassov has been as good as unknown except to the few who have come across the German translation, Wer Lebt Glücklich in Russland, published some thirty odd years ago in Reclam's Universal-Bibliothek, and to the few who can read Russian. Many of us must have heard Nekrassov's name—isn't there something about him in Mr. Maurice Baring's attractive little book on Russian Literature in the Home University Library?—but to most of us he was only a name.

Well, no one is likely to forget Nekrassov who reads Juliet M. Soskice's translation, the first into English, of Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia? By way of introduction David Soskice tells us something of Nekrassov's life. His father was a Russian officer, and his mother the daughter of a rich Polish aristocrat. Soon after the poet's birth in 1821 his father left the army, and went to live on his estate in the Yaroslav province, on the banks of the Volga. On long drives about the countryside with his father, who had become chief of the district police, Nekrassov learned as a boy to know the peasants and their sufferings. At seventeen he went to Petrograd, where he had to shift for himself, having quarrelled with his father, and learned to know poverty. "For three years," he has said, "I was hungry all day and every day. It was not only that I ate bad food and not enough of that, but some days I did not eat at all." Later in life he was able to buy a literary review, Sovremenik, which "was a stupendous success," Dr. Soskice says, "and brought him great fame and wealth." But his knowledge of the peasants remained fresh in his memory to the last, and he did not forget what poverty had taught him.

Near the end of his life Nekrassov wrote Who Can Be Happy in Russia? "There are few literate persons in Russia," Dr. Soskice tells us, "who do not know whole pages of this poem by heart. It will live as long as Russian literature exists; and its artistic value as an instrument for the depiction of Russian nature and the soul of the Russian people can be compared only with that of the great epics of Homer with regard to the legendary life of ancient Greece." It is the saving grace of these inevitable comparisons that they are not really inevitable. Most readers, I imagine, will enjoy the poem more if they do not ask whether it is an epic, but let it make its own impression.

Nekrassov's plan is quite simple. A few peasants from different villages, meeting one day on a highroad, and falling into a dispute as to who can be happy in Russia, set off together wandering on foot, resolved not to see their wives and children again, or the old people, until they get an answer to their question. What they see and what they hear are the same thing—a series of pictures, pictures of Russian landscape and peasant life, and of strange Russian hearts.

Down the Volga, when the mowers are at work in the high grass on its banks, comes a landowner, a pomyeshchick, with his sons, daughters-in-law, grandchildren, a wet-nurse, a dry nurse, and servants—two boatloads of them, besides a boatload of musicians. A table is laid for him near the river, and he has luncheon, with music and red foreign wines, and gives vodka to the mowers, while his servants wave branches over him to keep the flies away. The pomyeshchick is very old, and as lean as a hare in winter, he has long white moustaches and wears a high-crowned white and red cap. He falls into sadden rages, as when he pokes into a haystack, finds the hay damp, and orders the hay spread on the ground. The visiting peasants touch it—it is dry as tinder. Why, they ask the mowers, do you obey such an order from a foolish old man? Why do you take any orders from him, now that the serfs have been set free? Then the story comes out. The old man is quite mad. The hay is not his at all, it belongs to the Commune, but he does not know this. Nobody has been able to convince him that his serfs have been freed, that his power is gone. So his sons, by kind words and gifts, have persuaded the peasants who used to be his serfs to humor the old man whose end is so near, to endure a little longer his tyranny and his outbursts. In the picture of this exceptional survival we see the absolute capricious power that once existed all over Russia.

A woman finds a crowd about her eight-year-old-boy, Fedotka. He is a shepherd, and they are going to beat him because he gave a lamb to the she-wolf. He tells his mother what happened. When he was alone with his flock the wolf attacked it and carried off the lamb. He followed her by the traces of blood left by her low-hanging breasts, beat her and took the lamb away, quite dead. The she-wolf herself was scarce living.

> She gnashed with her teeth
> And her breathing was heavy;
> And two streams of blood ran
> From under her body.
> Her ribs could be counted,
> Her head was hung down,
> But her eyes, little mother,
> Looked straight into mine . . .
> Then she groaned of a sudden,
> She groaned, and it sounded
> As if she were crying.
> I threw her the lamb.

His mother tells him to run home and not to look back. She endures the beating they had meant to give her boy, but the censor did not pass that part of his story.

Misery, however, is by no means all of Nekrassov's poem. These peasants, although capable of burying a German alive, are both cruel and kind and curiously gentle. They smile at the traveler whom they stop on the road, and who calls them brigands; they smile and ask him, "How can we be brigands?" We see these peasants when they are gay, and drinking and dancing and singing folk-songs. We see the parish priest whose horse is "like a barrel, his bees are all swollen and booming like church-bells." We see a family in a cottage listening while the pilgrim tells them a story, the children keeping awake late on their sleeping-planks, lying on their stomachs "like snug little seals upon Archangel ice-blocks." But no extracts can give me more than a hazy notion of the freshness and abundance of Nekrassov's pictures of Russian life. The poor verse of the translation cannot spoil them. P. L.

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Mortmain

His Family, by Ernest Poole. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.50.

IT is not simply as a narrator that Mr. Poole tells this story of a family. It is also as the high exponent of what phrenologists call the philoprogenitive bump. An explicit text is one of the most difficult things to handle in a novel, chiefly because a novel is supposed to suggest life and life is not arranged according to any explicit text, but Mr. Poole reveals a text at the beginning of this novel and recurs to it over and over again. Considering the skill of the author not only as a terse and effective reporter but also as a dramatizer, the result is too good not to be altogether deplorable. If it were less good it could be ignored.

The family is so fixed an institution and ideas about it are so stagnant, any fresh view of it is a boon. When you think that the only dishonesty which John Morley could bring himself to sanction in his essay on compromise was dishonesty to one's mother—never hinting or perhaps even suspecting that there *must* be something wrong with the institution of the family if it could go beyond the church and the state in requiring hothouse censorial protection—you realize the dead weight of convention in this respect. Ibsen brought some relief. The Way of All Flesh, Mr. Gosse's Father and Son, in a minor degree Ann Veronica, managed to set the family in a new light, while Freud's formulation of the Oedipus complex and the Electra complex has gone a great distance in showing the immense need of revising the helpless bourgeois acceptances of our inherited domestic tepee. But there is nothing of the boon of fresh perception along these lines in Mr. Poole's new novel. Mr. Poole reveals an intense bourgeois respectability. He takes the eminent institution of the family with an almost unbelievable deference. There is for him no escapable hardship in the many hardships which his narrative takes account of. There is, on the other hand, a quite recondite romance in the words of the dying wife, the text of his novel: "And when you come after me, my dear, oh, how hungry I shall be for all you will tell me. For you will live on in our children's lives."

This business of a healthy man living on in his children's lives is the business that His Family illustrates. Roger Gale is a widower with three daughters of marrying age—and he is an inarticulate New England widower! Luckily for our nerves, he does not select a rock-ribbed New Hampshire farm as the scene of sustained inarticulation. He has the kindness to appear in rugged middle-age as a bluff substantial householder in New York City. The swarming life of twentieth-century New York inundates his home enough to keep it from the stagnancy suitable to its tradition. It is the home, all the same, of a father ill at ease with those whom he loves and by whom he is beloved. The emphasis of the story is the continuity of this family, with the author striving to be modernistic by showing how one of the daughters combines maternity with her career.

If Mr. Poole were primarily an artist, writing a novel for the sake of giving such emotion as a work of art can convey, his insistence would not be nearly so great on his specific idea of the family. But the thing that seems to lead Mr. Poole to write a novel is the same thing that led Zola to write novels—the desire to illustrate a large group-idea by the processes of fiction. It is really the way of the scientist as against the way of the artist, involving as it does the need to prove something by the ordinary experiences of mankind. The artist does not look to these experiences to prove anything—he is content if he can make them give you an emotion. The scientist, on the contrary, has an intellectual interest in them. He wants the experiences which he selects to give you an idea. For that reason, if it is at all possible, he selects typical experiences and fastens them on to typical people, and he is much less interested in the people's own attitude toward themselves than in their subordination to the theory. The result, as Zola and Brieux have shown repeatedly, is to demonstrate a theory with amazing forcefulness, but to deaden one's belief in the creatures represented. And this, despite Mr. Poole's faculty for dynamic incident and keen description, is the main effect of His Family. There is hardly a page on which some one does not have an appropriate emotion. "With a grim smile on his heavy visage, Roger stared out of his window. Slowly the smile faded, a wistful look came on his face. 'Who'll take my business when I'm gone?' If his small son had only lived, with what new zest and vigor it might have been made to grow and expand. If only his son had been here by his side. . . ." Do men in the newspaper-clipping business really behave in this fashion? One feels that it is Mr. Poole who is managing that grim smile and wistful look in obedience to his own abstraction.

Most didactic novels are dull. His Family is not dull. Barring its conventional attitude toward the family as an institution and barring the subordination of its characters to that conventional attitude, it has movement and color and grace and many illuminating glimpses of character. One of the safest guesses in the world is that parents are inarticulate with their children, and Mr. Poole has convinced us of Roger Gale sufficiently to make his inarticulation real. The daughter who lives with him, Deborah, is a New York City teacher with radical ideas, and the groping embarrassed sympathy between these two is clearly imagined. The difficulties created by Edith, eldest daughter, with a brood of five children, and Laura, youngest daughter, with no children and no intention of having any, are also admirably conceived. The invention is realistic where so many novelists fail to make it realistic—as, for instance, in the case of the friction caused by Edith's savage exactingness in regard to her children's dentist bills and private schooling, and her hardness in kicking out the dependent Johnny because he might infect her own precious brood. The character of Bruce, the speedy New Yorker, is another example of Mr. Poole's essay at portraiture that is free from any taint of purpose. It is only where traditional picturesqueness is introduced, as in the case of Roger Gale's collection of "strange old glittering rings," or where conventional psychology is employed, as in the whole portrayal of Laura, the worldling, or where descriptive reporting is substituted for personal impressions, as in the account of Deborah's school, that Mr. Poole's artistic deficiency is glaring. The tenderness that he shows about the New Hampshire farm, the death of Bruce, the maternal crisis of Deborah, are recompense for such deficiencies.

But there is no ultimate recompense for the solemn theme that runs through His Family. Beginning with its pernicious enunciation on page 6, it comes back on pages 18, 25, 45, 85, 95, 118, 123, 149, 161, 196, 236, 268, 286, and heaven knows in how many other places—the theme that people live on in their children's lives. "'I moulded you, my little son. And as I have been to you,

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so you will be to your children. In their lives, too, we shall be there—silent and invisible, the dim strong figures of the past. For this is the power of families, this is the mystery of birth'" (p. 123). "A wistful look crept over his face. 'In their lives too we shall be there, the dim strong figures of the past'" (p. 196). "If you marry Baird, I see you both go on together in your work, while in your home you struggle through the troubles, tangles, joys and griefs which most of us mortals know so well! I see you in a world of children, but with children, too, of your own—to keep your spirit always young! Living on in your children's lives!" (p. 268). There is something in it, naturally, but not as Mr. Poole presents it. The maternalism of Deborah is clearly his comment on the feministic problem. It is a comment all too firmly based on a conventional view of the family, failing to consider that in the end "family pride must be denied and mortified."

F. H.

The Wise Fool

Russia in 1916, by Stephen Graham. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.25.

POLITICAL wisdom is hardly to be expected of Stephen Graham. Had an early convert of Paul's visited Rome he would not, in all probability, have given any illuminating criticism of the imperial policies of Tiberius. The political cliques at the capital would have seemed trivial and cheap. In all Stephen Graham's writings there is something of this freshness and naïveté of the early Christian. "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's"—he has made this a kind of permanent background to his thinking, with no little impatience and rasping at those who do not feel the relative unimportance of Caesar and all his works. Of course this is an alien and disturbing accent in an age so preoccupied with political alarums and excursions, and naturally enough Mr. Graham's almost contemptuous detachment has brought upon him the epithet of sentimentalist. Gorky, for instance, cannot restrain his indignation at Mr. Graham's earlier book, The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary. Gorky says he can see the English capitalist rubbing his hands with glee at the anticipated exploitation of the impractical and gullible Russian peasant whom Mr. Graham describes with such delight. But this is silly. Mr. Graham does believe in Holy Russia or, if you like, in the genuine and moving Christian reality behind that myth; he does hate the soulless commercialism of Manchester as much as he hates the upstart bourgeois capitalists of the new industrialized Russia. He does feel the glamour of Russia, and he does pierce through with quick sympathy to that quality in it most akin to the dreaming unworldliness of the east. To carry home to England the message of the beauty of that religious background he considers a first-rate task in spiritual interpretation. Certainly no one else has performed it with such insight and grace, with such suppleness and color. "It is something of a paradox," writes Mr. Graham, "that the bright spirits of Russia should hate the melancholy vistas of Tambof and Kaluga and that the bright spirits of England should hate the gloom of Newcastle and Leeds, that one should look with love from England to the wandering pilgrims of Tambof and the other should sigh for the clamour of wheels where 'man at least is master.'"

Yet it is a paradox which Mr. Graham himself has little difficulty in understanding, and to his readers, too, it explains his well nigh perverse blindness to the signs of the coming revolution. If Russia were merely so-and-so, he says somewhat peevishly in one passage, if she were merely Azef, Miliukof, Kerensky and Count Benckendorf, "how little interest she would have for us!" That has an exceedingly curious ring nowadays when the names of Miliukof and Kerensky have become the symbols of new Russia's aspirations in the most distant towns of the earth, when the picture of the Czar as the passionate anti-German, which Mr. Graham's pen makes him, seems almost a wilful caricature. Nevertheless one must have very dull perceptions to lay stress on Mr. Graham's blunders in political judgment or on his bad prophecies. Unquestionably he will survey the new era in Russia with considerable misgivings, but to identify him for that with the conventional interested reactionary is to go wide of the mark. One can easily fancy how a French author of the early nineteenth century, enamored of the traditions of gentility and wit and capricious irresponsibility of Versailles, might have been angered at the impertinence of the sansculottes who threatened the collapse of that delicate and artificial fabric. The Republic of Russia! Mr. Graham has no particular love of poverty and suffering for themselves, he does not worship the cruel rigors of an autocratic régime, yet the word "republic" may well make him shiver. He has visited this republic of ours and he knows the democracies of England and France, and he honestly does not like them. His only deeper anger is at the system and science and order and cleanliness of Germany. Russia still keeps for him a real spiritual beauty. But a democratized, industrial and commercially prosperous Russia may mean the inevitable evap-

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oration of that mysticism and romance which it has been Mr. Graham's chief task to make vivid.

This political indifferentism does not in other respects vitiate Mr. Graham's observations. Russia in 1916 is a slight book made hastily from some travel notes at the urgent request of those of Mr. Graham's readers who had come to assess at its deservedly high value his alert and sensitive intelligence. Discount the politics and the war prophecies, and much that is genuinely revelatory and illuminating does emerge. Mr. Graham can show what a Russia without vodka, beer or wine is like, contrasted with the old Russia. He can picture the new economic conditions introduced by the depreciation of the ruble. Characteristically, he has discovered the "porazhentsi," the people who believe in defeat, although Brusiloff's victories of the spring of 1916 rather shook their gloomy faith. His picture of the mood in which Russia accepts the war will endure. It is summed up, according to Mr. Graham, in the lines of the poet Khomiakoff. "Podvig" is not translated because of its fringe of religious and emotional meanings. Perhaps the nearest English word is "trial"—it means any act of faith or renunciation or sacrifice.

> The *podvig* is in battle;
> The *podvig* is in struggle:
> The highest *podvig* is in patience,
> Love and prayer.

Even at the risk of displeasing the western political radicals Mr. Graham should not be frightened from his attempts to convey to us the religious background of Russia. He can bring out the shadows and spiritual chiaroscuro of the thrilling panorama of revolution.

H. S.

What We Must Do

Mobilizing America, by Arthur Bullard. New York: The Macmillan Co. $.50.

IN this war the old aphorism that nations never learn from each other seems but a stale generalization from the forgotten era of nationalistic isolation. Present-day states are forced to learn from one another, not through any persuasive cogency in the idea itself or any growth of real international wisdom but through the sheer compulsion of economic factors. The egotism of even the proudest of states has been thoroughly humbled by the war's brutal revelation of the network of international trade and goodwill upon which not only its political stability but its very life depend. The ancient self-sufficient arrogance of states was a sort of off-shoot of the ancient ability of scattered agricultural communities to be self-supporting. Now it is gone. Federalism on a supernational scale is imperative in some form or other. Only China, America and Russia could build a wall about themselves and defy the rest of the world to starve them—and none of those nations desire that provincialism. A decent international organization may emerge from this war, if not because of the attractiveness of an ideal, then because of the demands of industry. The Allies, just as the Central Powers, have learned the military value of economic coöperation—at a high cost, perhaps, yet they have learned it. Mr. Bullard points out in his admirable monograph how we can avoid their mistakes.

Naturally his conclusions are for the most part deduced from the blunders of England in the first fifteen months, because England in her easy optimism and her total lack of effective industrial organization offers the most salutary lesson to us. One fallacy in particular he urges us to avoid, the "short war" fallacy. Even France made that initial mistake. We can hope and work diplomatically for an early peace as much as we desire, but we may pay a shocking price in blood and capital if we fail to organize our resources and men in terms of a late peace. The evils of the volunteer system, at all events, are definitely exorcised by our promptness in adopting conscription. There is small chance now of our enlisting skilled engineers as ordinary privates and then hastily recalling them when the technical shortage is discovered. We have set about putting our industrial house in order with a celerity that must be disheartening to the German Foreign Office, if the members of that home of illusions ever look beyond the end of Wilhelmstrasse. There is little chance, either, of our making the traditional error about the censorship. Mr. Bullard contends that the jest that the censorship in England kept knowledge about the army from everybody except the Germans was something more than wit. It was not many months before the various general staffs had so completely forgotten their penchant for secrecy that journalists were deliberately imported. Publicity was recognized as even more important than a local military success. For without the interest and enthusiasm of those "back home" a modern nation cannot wage war a year; and unlike the old days of romance and heroic jousts trench warfare is only comparable to a giant industry. It is as difficult to make dramatic as the building of the Panama Canal, and ten times as important. Nor does Mr. Bullard neglect to emphasize the value of "mere" civilian criticism. In fact, even the minds of the militarists have undergone a curious change in this respect, that is, the minds of all the militarists except those in our own country. In Europe generals and chiefs of staff actually welcome suggestions from intelligent laymen. They have learned to be humble about narrow military strategy. War has become a bigger coöperative adventure than it seemed to them in the chess problem days of the military academy.

On the question of the relations between capital and labor during wartime Mr. Bullard puts all his emphasis on the word temporary. Labor unions will voluntarily waive their right to strike, even their hard-won standards of short hours, provided they can be persuaded that so doing is but an emergency war measure. The patriotism of the worker is almost disconcerting in its fervor—so long as he feels that his patriotism is being used and not exploited for private profit. The selfish and corrupt capitalist of socialistic imagining, he, too, will submit in the quietest fashion to high income taxation and excess profit sharing provided he does not suspect confiscation. Either suspicion is fatal, the suspicion that wartime measures are only a cloak for a secret attack on the rights and privileges of labor or the suspicion that wartime measures are but preliminary steps to a permanent state socialism. It is the function of the government promptly and effectively to allay both suspicions. Individual industrial plants, according to Mr. Bullard, so long as they come up to the mark in labor standards and in productivity should be let alone. When they do fail, however, the government should show no hesitation about taking over the entire plant.

It will be seen that Mr. Bullard is not concerned with problems of permanent industrial betterment. He does not even discuss our justification for entering the war. He accepts the fact, and tries to outline a pragmatic program of effective action. It is a successful performance, a

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genuine inspiration to the ordinary citizen bewildered by the chaos of our strength but eager for order and for some lifting of his own sense of impotence. One can only hope that the sanity and helpfulness of Mr. Bullard's fertile suggestions will not be lost in the maze of Washington officialdom. H. S.

Selling to South America

Exporting to Latin-America, by Ernst B. Filsinger. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $3.00.

IT is a peculiarity of the widening United States—one may not, in this relation, say "American"—vision in trade, that although our commerce with all Latin-America is but one-eighth of our total foreign trade, it constitutes about ninety per cent of the public discussion and imagination. The sentimental solidarity of the Western Hemisphere is apparent in the instinctive turning of the American business man, hitherto devoted to the home market, to Latin-American opportunities. One hears less of Canada, although seven million Canadians normally buy more from the United States than the eighty million residents of the twenty republics to the south. It is not strange that in using Exporting to Latin-America as the title of his almost encyclopaedic compendium of practical selling information, Mr. Ernst B. Filsinger makes a shrewd appeal, although the hints, carefully indexed and grouped in 565 pages, apply, in many instances, to business in other markets, as it is an axiom that sound business principles are the same abroad as at home, their practice differing according to environment.

The writer's authority appears to have been derived from the experience of manufacturing shoes for both domestic and Latin-American markets. His point of view is that of the smaller manufacturer desirous of selling overseas such portion of his production as will serve as a balance wheel against recurring periods of domestic depression. As the National Foreign Trade Council constantly urges, the future welfare of American foreign trade largely depends upon a constantly increasing number of industrial and commercial enterprises of moderate size benefiting by this opportunity and a wider dispersion of the benefits of export trade. The book bears evidence of prolonged study and careful sifting of governmental reports and public discussion of foreign trade problems, balanced by personal experience and judgment. Manufacturers and merchants anxious to discover and improve foreign trade opportunities will find of particular interest the chapters on Latin-American Correspondence, Banking Documents, Credits, Catalogues and Quotations, Parcel Post and Mail Order Business, but the subjects covered extend to practically all the questions that business men are compelled to ask in advertising new lines.

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Nathan Hale to a Friend at Verdun

Friendly Sir:

This is the first opportunity I have had of acknowledging your request for News from Home. By good fortune I am in Receipt of your Letter in New Haven & therefore am able to give you a late Account of Doings at your Alma Mater.

You would be diverted to observe the Faculty Platoon at drill upon the Campus. I saw your Friend, Charles Seymour, in it yesterday. Everyone here is speaking of his Book[1] & it will give you pleasure to know that it contains just the sound Reason, good Sense, and lack of Prejudice that we relish'd in that Discourse in your Room, when he enumerated the diplomatic Events that led up to the War.

Wherever one betakes him now, the Conversation turns either upon Munitions or Food. Being on Furlough, I take more interest in the latter. Everyone is sensible of the fact that Famine is to be met by the careful Preservation & Storage of Food to outlast the Year, & by prudent Selection of Diet. Knowing little of Food beyond what pleases my Palate, I was greatly embarrassed to find myself on a Food Committee. To conceal my Ignorance, I have been reading diligently. Concerning the Preservation of Foods I have gathered profitable Items from Professor Mendel's Book,[2] while I have acquir'd most encouraging Knowledge of Nourishment in inexpensive Rations from a Volume in which my Friend, Richard Cabot, has assured me is contained "all that is really known about Diet."[3] Irving Fisher's "Diet and Endurance"[4] is likewise a useful Pamphlet. (You will be pleased to know that he is still waging his fight against Alcohol.)

Give my Comp'ts to our English Lieutenant. Tell him that I am sending him a Book by the Post which will inform him of all I didn't know about our Navy when he ask'd me regarding it.[5] By the bye, if you don't know more of the Navy than I did or than most People here at Home, I counsel you to peruse it too.

I ask your Pardon for writing you a Letter so full of the Fittings for War & in atonement I am sending you a Volume that has just the Charms in which my Epistle is deficient. In the first place, it is written by a Lady (a very well-born and clever one); secondly, it is brief and diverting; and thirdly, it has not so much as a remote connection with the War.[6]

I remain with Esteem
Yr Sincere Friend & Hble Svt.
N. Hale.

[1] THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR, 1870-1914. By Charles Seymour. (Fourth Printing.) $2.00 net.

[2] CHANGES IN THE FOOD SUPPLY AND THEIR RELATION TO NUTRITION. By Lafayette B. Mendel. 50 cents net.

[3] THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF NUTRITION. By Graham Lusk. (Fourth Printing.) 50 cents net.

[4] THE EFFECT OF DIET ON ENDURANCE. By Irving Fisher. 50 cents net.

[5] OUR MANY-SIDED NAVY. By Robert W. Neeser. 41 illustrations. $2.50 net.

[6] A JOURNEY TO OHIO IN 1810. As Recorded in the Journal of Margaret Van Horn Dwight. Edited, with an Introduction, by Max Farrand. (Third Printing.) $1.00 net.

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

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